Technology Licensing to a Rival by Corinne Langinier & Caroline Boivin
Technology Licensing to a Rival 
Caroline Boivin Corinne Langinier
University of Sherbrooke Iowa State University
Abstract
Licensing a new technology implies introducing competition into the market. This has a
negative effect on the profit of the incumbent if the demand remains unchanged. However,
because of the novel content of an innovation, consumers may have different perceptions of
the value of a good depending on the market structure. Thus, the introduction of a competitor
into the market may enhance demand, and consequently have a positive effect on the profit of
the incumbent. In a simple setting, we show that the incumbent may decide to license her
technology even in the absence of a royalty when the positive effect outweighs the negative
one.
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Technology licensing is generally viewed as a revenue-generating device. It might be a way
of ensuring that a technology will be commercialized by a more eﬃcient ﬁrm (e.g., a ﬁrm
that has a better distribution system in place). In return for the use of her technology,
the innovator gets a reward in the form of royalties (Tirole 1988). Even if an innovator
sells her own products, it may also be proﬁtable to license a technology that would be
incorporated into a product oﬀered in an independent market where the marketing skills
of the innovator may not be as strong. In this way, the license has no competitive impact
but generates additional revenues for the innovator.
Licensing may also be used for strategic considerations. Rockett (1990) shows that an
innovator may use technology licensing to prevent the entry of strong competitors. Before
her patent expires, the innovator licenses the technology to weaker competitors. These
ﬁrms have some time to get a foothold in the market before others can join, and then
ultimately, this discourages later entrants. Licensing thus enables the innovator to choose
her competitors. Licensing may also be a way to impose a technology on a market where
incompatible technologies are candidates to become a standard. The aggressive licensing
strategy used by VHS patent holders certainly contributed to the victory of the VHS
technology over Betamax on the video market. Many ﬁrms have also recognized that cross-
licensing is mutually beneﬁcial in order to ensure that the introduction of a technology
will not be blocked. This is especially true in markets such as telecommunications, where
new products or services incorporate a large number of patented innovations.
Licensing may have a positive impact on demand, so that there may be beneﬁts to
licensing in terms of market expansion. Shepard (1987) and Farrell and Gallini (1988)
show that licensing may stimulate demand, since consumers would not fear being victims
of opportunism on the incumbent’s part because she faces competition. Shepard (1987)
demonstrates that licensing acts as a guarantee of the quality of the products, while
Farrell and Gallini (1988) show that licensing prevents future price increases. Although
these beneﬁts may be substantial, these studies do not consider that an increase in demand
may be suﬃcient to ensure the proﬁtability of a licensing strategy.
Conner (1995) goes further in the analysis of the beneﬁts of market expansion from
licensing. She determines the conditions under which it is proﬁtable for an incumbent to
license her technology for free to an entrant that will use the technology to introduce his
own product and compete on the incumbent’s market. She shows that licensing is a proﬁt-
maximizing strategy when network externalities are strong enough, but only if the quality
of the entrant’s products is lower than the quality of the incumbent’s products. Under
these circumstances, the licensee covers the inferior portion of the market that consists
of consumers with low valuations of the product. Thus, the licensee does not steal many
customers from the incumbent, and the presence of network externalities results in an
increase in willingness-to-pay of the incumbent’s customers.
We follow in Conner’s footsteps in suggesting that the increase in demand resulting
from licensing may be large enough to induce an innovator to share her technology. Our
1results establish that it may be proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to license her technology to a rival
who would compete in the same market in a homogenous-product duopoly setting, even
without royalties. Whereas, in much of the licensing literature, it is assumed that the
licensor does not market the technology (e.g., Bousquet et al., 1998), we consider an
innovator who markets her technology and can also license it to another ﬁrm.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2. We ﬁrst
determine the demand and deﬁne the equilibrium quantities and payoﬀs. In section 3 we
study the licensing behavior of the leader in absence of royalties. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a two-period model in which an incumbent (leader) has to decide whether to
share her technology via a license with a potential licensee (follower).
The timing of the game is as follows:
• First, the leader decides whether to license her technology. The follower then accepts
it or not.
• In the second stage, if both ﬁrms are in the market, they decide their production
level in a Cournot competition.
Using a backward induction argument, we ﬁr s td e t e r m i n et h eq u a n t i t yo ﬀered by each
ﬁrm, depending on the structure of the market and on the demand. Second, we determine
whether the follower accepts the technology.
Demand plays an important role in our setting, as the structure of the market directly
inﬂuences the demand. We assume that consumers have diﬀerent perceptions of the value
of the good depending on whether only one ﬁrm oﬀers the good or two ﬁrms oﬀer two
similar goods. We ﬁrst present the detailed demand structure, before turning to the
competition stage.
2.1 Consumers’ Behavior and Demand
The perception of the value of a good is based not only on its intrinsic characteristics, but
also on marketing cues. This is especially true for new products whose characteristics and
performance are still unknown to consumers. For instance, Moorthy and Zhao (2000) ﬁnd
that advertising expenditures and perceived quality are generally positively correlated.
Advertising may act as a signal that the ﬁrm believes enough in the product to devote
ﬁnancial resources to its promotion. The signal of quality may, thus, be even stronger if
another ﬁrm enters the market and promotes the product.
The demand structure is aﬀected by the decision of the follower to enter or not.
Consumers value diﬀerently the good oﬀered by a single ﬁrm, and the goods oﬀered by
two ﬁrms. We assume a simple framework in which each consumer consumes 0 or 1 unit
2of the good. The good is characterized by an index s that represents the perception of
the value of the good by consumers. A consumer who is not willing to buy a product
oﬀered by a monopoly may be willing to buy it once he can observe that another ﬁrm has
decided to market the technology. The fact that another ﬁrm is backing the technology
is a signal of the value of the good to the consumer. If the product is just oﬀered by the
monopoly, the perception of the value by consumers is sm, whereas if another ﬁrm has
entered the market, it becomes sd. To keep the model as general as possible, we impose no
restrictions on the relationship between sm and sd.I ft h ev a l u eo ft h eg o o di sp o s i t i v e l y
related to the number of ﬁrms on the market then sd >s m.





θsm − pm if a monopoly serves the market, and the consumer buys at price pm,
θsd − pd if a duopoly serves the market, and the consumer buys at price pd,
0 if the consumer does not buy,
where θ represents the taste parameter of the consumer and is distributed according to
a density function f(θ) with a cumulative function F(θ). F(θ) represents the fraction of
consumers with a taste parameter inferior to θ. We assume that θ is distributed uniformly
on [0,1].
If there is no entry, the leader has a monopoly position in the market. Consumers with
utility smaller than 0 do not buy. Thus, θ<p m/sm represents the fraction of consumers
who do not buy the good and the demand for the monopoly is Dm(pm)=N[1−F(pm/sm)],
where N is the total number of consumers that we normalize to be 1. As we assume a
uniform distribution, the demand function for the monopoly is Dm(pm)=1−pm/sm and
the inverse demand function becomes
pm(q)=sm(1 − q). (1)
If the follower accepts the license, the structure of the market is a duopoly. The
fraction of consumers who buy the product increases by [F(pm/sm)−F(pd/sd)], and thus,
the new demand becomes Dd(pd,p m)=1−F(pm/sm)+F(pm/sm)−F(pd/sd),w h i c hg i v e s
the inverse demand function
pd(q)=sd(1 − q). (2)
2.2 Competition in Quantity
We now derive the quantities provided by the ﬁrms when there is no technology licensing
(monopoly) and when there is technology licensing (duopoly).
2.2.1 Monopoly
If the follower does not enter, the leader has a monopoly and the demand is given by
(1). Thus, the monopoly maximizes her proﬁt Πm = pm(q)q −c1q, where c1 i st h ec o s to f
production per unit. The monopoly quantity is qm =( sm−c1)/2sm,w h e r ec1 <s m ≤ 3c1,1
1We assume that the leader’s cost of production is relatively high.







If the follower accepts the license oﬀered for free by the leader, both ﬁrms compete in




1 = pd(q1,q 2)q1 − c1q1,
Π
d
2 = pd(q1,q 2)q2 − c2q2,
where c2 is the per unit cost of production of the follower. The proﬁt maximization gives
the following quantities
q1 =




sd − 2c2 + c1
3sd
, (5)
where sd > 2c1 − c2 and sd > 2c2 − c1. The duopoly price is pd =( sd + c2 + c1)/3. The










(sd − 2c2 + c1)2
9sd
. (7)
3L i c e n s i n g D e c i s i o n
We only consider the case in which the leader licenses her technology for free. This enables
us to isolate two opposite eﬀects of technology licensing. From the leader’s point of view,
technology licensing ﬁr s th a san e g a t i v ei m p a c to nh e rp r o ﬁt, since her market share
decreases. Second, as demand may increase with the entry of another ﬁrm, there is also
a potential positive eﬀect on her proﬁt resulting from the expansion of the market. The
positive impact may then compensate for the erosion in market share and make licensing
attractive, even when it does not bring in additional revenues in the form of dividends.
In this setting, each ﬁrm gets a duopoly payoﬀ Πd
i =( sd − 2ci + cj)2/9sd,w h e r e
i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j, for producing at least the minimum quantity that can be detected
by consumers on the market. Indeed, the demand is deﬁned by the consumers’ perceived
value of the good, which is, in turn, inﬂuenced by the number of ﬁrms. To convince
consumers that they are present in the market, ﬁrms must produce at least a minimum
4q u a n t i t y ,t h a tw ed e n o t eκ, and we further assume that κ<1/3. The follower accepts
a license as long as he gets a positive proﬁt, i.e., Πd
2 > 0. The leader decides to license
her technology if it is worthwhile, as the introduction of a new ﬁrm in the market has a






Furthermore, both ﬁrms need to produce at least κ to inform consumers that two ﬁrms are
producing, or equivalently, sd ≥ (2c1−c2)/(1−3κ) ≡ f1(c2) and sd ≥ (2c2−c1)/(1−3κ) ≡
f2(c2) must be satisﬁed.2
Inequality (8) holds for certain constellations of parameters (sd,c 2). Indeed, as long as
the introduction of a competitor does not increase demand, i.e., sd <s m, the monopoly
licenses her technology if sd > (3sm + c1)/2 − c2 ≡ ϕ(c2). On the other hand, if sd ≥ sm,
for high values of the follower’s cost (i.e., c2 > 2c1), the monopoly always licenses, whereas
for lower values (i.e., c2 ≤ 2c1), she licenses only if sd >φ (c2) where φ(c2) is deﬁned in
the appendix.
Overall, licensing occurs if (sd,c 2) ∈ {(sd,c 2)/sd ≥ φ(c2) and sd ≥ f2(c2)}.W e




















Figure 1: Licensing for free, sm ≤ 3c1
Consider a given high enough sd (i.e., sd >s m), as represented by point X in ﬁgure
1. At this point, the leader does not share her technology and enjoys a monopoly proﬁt.
If the cost of production of the follower increases from point X to point Y ,t h el e a d e r
2Those conditions are more restrictive than the conditions on positive quantities.
5now shares her technology, and thus gets a duopoly proﬁt. As the cost of production for
her competitor increases, the leader is more willing to share her technology, as she will
produce more than the licensee. On the other hand, if we consider a given level of cost
c2 (point W in ﬁgure 1), and sd increases, we go from a regime where the leader does not
share her technology to a regime where she does. This is because the entry of a competitor
enhanced the demand enough. This can happen even if the follower’s cost of production
is low. Thus, there are two eﬀects: a demand eﬀe c ta n dac o s te ﬀect.
Result The leader licenses her technology for free when the entry of a competitor suf-
ﬁciently enhances demand, and/or his cost of production is high enough, i.e., for
sd ≥ max{φ(c2),ϕ(c2)}. The follower only accepts the technology licensing if sd ≥
f2(c2).
Even in the absence of royalties, the leader ﬁnds it proﬁtable to license her technology
when the introduction of a competitor increases the demand. As Figure 1 illustrates, the
leader’s incentive to license her technology depends on: (i) the change in the consumers’
perception of the value; (ii) the relative cost of production.
When there is a low cost of production for the follower, the leader prefers to keep
her monopoly position unless the demand stimulation is large. If the follower has a cost
a d v a n t a g e ,t h el e a d e re x p e c t sal a r g ed e c r e a s ei nh e rm a r k e ts h a r ef o l l o w i n gt h ee n t r y
of a rival. The demand stimulation thus must be high in order to compensate for the
erosion of the market share. As the follower’s cost advantage decreases, the demand
stimulation necessary to make licensing proﬁtable for the innovator also decreases. In the
case of higher cost of production for the follower, and if the follower produces, the leader
prefers to license her technology. The same logic may be used to explain the intuition of
the result. If the leader has a cost advantage, she expects only a small reduction of her
market share following the entry of a rival. A small demand stimulation is thus suﬃcient
to compensate for the reduction in the market share and to make licensing attractive. As
the follower’s cost of production increases, technology sharing is less likely to occur, since
the proﬁtability of the follower’s entry decreases.
We also need to consider the behavior of the ﬁrms when sd <f 1(c2) (the duopoly
quantity of the leader is smaller than κ)a n d / o rsd <f 2(c2) (the duopoly quantity of
the follower is smaller than κ). In the former case (respectively, the latter case), the
leader (respectively, the follower) can decide to produce κ or to produce less, and thus,
the demand is no longer represented by (2) but by (1). Indeed, if one of the quantities
is too small, consumers cannot correctly infer that two ﬁrms are in the market, and they
have the demand (1). However, the leader is better oﬀ by keeping her monopoly position,
i.e., by not licensing her technology in the ﬁrst place. When the minimum quantity κ
increases, the area where the leader shares her technology shrinks as the function f2(c2)
rotates to the left around c1/2.
Thus, the leader shares her technology if (i) the demand enhancement is large enough
and/or (ii) the cost for the follower is not too large, and ﬁnally (iii) if neither ﬁrm has
to produce too much to signal his or her presence in the market.
64C o n c l u s i o n
Our results establish that it may be proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to license a product innovation
to a rival that would compete on the same market in a homogenous-product duopoly
setting even without royalties. The proﬁtability of licensing is directly linked to demand
stimulation brought about by a potential increased in perceived quality by consumers
following the entry of a second ﬁrm on the market.
These results are especially valuable for ﬁrms introducing new products on the market
since the presence of a rival may act as a signal of quality and thus enhance demand.
Trying to avoid competition may not thus be the best strategic prescription.
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Appendix
The leader licenses as long as Πd
1 > Πm, where Πm and Πd
1 are deﬁned by equations (3)
and (6). If sd <s m, Πd
1 > Πm as long as sd > (3sm+c1)/2−c2. On the other hand, if sd ≥
sm, Πd
1 > Πm is equivalent to having q2
1sd >q 2
msm and, thus, we only need to verify that
q1 >q m.T h i sl a s ti n e q u a l i t yi se q u i v a l e n tt o2sm(−2c1 + c2) >s d(sm − 3c1).D e p e n d i n g
on the signs of (−2c1 +c2) and (sm −3c1), this inequality does holds. As we assume that
sm ≤ 3c1,i fc2 > 2c1, Πd
1 > Πm,w h e r e a si fc2 ≤ 2c1, Πd







(3sm +3 c1)2 − 4sm(c1 +4 c2)).
Indeed, (sd − 2c1 + c2)2/9sd − (sm − c1)2/4sm > 0 if sd <φ








(3sm +3 c1)2 − 4sm(c1 +4 c2)).
We can check that φ(c2) is a decreasing and convex function.
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